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Abstract—Cyber attacks are growing in frequency and severity. Over the past year alone we have witnessed massive data breaches
that stole personal information of millions of people and wide-scale ransomware attacks that paralyzed critical infrastructure of several
countries. Combating the rising cyber threat calls for a multi-pronged strategy, which includes predicting when these attacks will occur.
The intuition driving our approach is this: during the planning and preparation stages, hackers leave digital traces of their activities on
both the surface web and dark web in the form of discussions on platforms like hacker forums, social media, blogs and the like. These
data provide predictive signals that allow anticipating cyber attacks. In this paper, we describe machine learning techniques based on
deep neural networks and autoregressive time series models that leverage external signals from publicly available Web sources to
forecast cyber attacks. Performance of our framework across ground truth data over real-world forecasting tasks shows that our
methods yield a significant lift or increase of F1 for the top signals on predicted cyber attacks. Our results suggest that, when deployed,
our system will be able to provide an effective line of defense against various types of targeted cyber attacks.
Index Terms—Cyber Event Forecasting, Signal Discovery, Cyber Security
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1 INTRODUCTION
IN today’s interconnected world, all types of private andproprietary information—from personal health records
and communications, to government records, bank informa-
tion, and intellectual property—are accessible over the In-
ternet. While the benefits of nearly ubiquitous, on-demand
access to information are significant, equally significant are
the risks that such access poses to individuals and organi-
zations by exposing them to cyber attacks. The risks posed
by cyber threat include financial losses and political insta-
bility, as demonstrated by high-profile attacks, including
massive Equifax and Yahoo! data breaches and Wannacry
ransomware, which paralyzed critical infrastructure world-
wide to include hospitals in the US and UK. For society
to continue enjoying the benefits of an open, worldwide
Internet, it is critical that we tame the rapidly growing cyber
threats posed by a variety of state and non-state actors.
One approach to combating cyber threats is to develop
technologies that anticipate them before an actual cyber
attack occurs. The intuition behind this forecasting approach
is the following. Cyber attacks do not occur in a vacuum.
To conduct a cyber attack, hackers first have to choose a
target, identify the attack surface (i.e, vulnerabilities in the
target’s software and hardware infrastructure), acquire the
necessary exploits, malware and expertise to use them, and
potentially recruit other participants. Other actors—system
administrators, security analysts, and even victims—may
discuss vulnerabilities or coordinate a response to exploits.
These activities are often conducted online, leaving a variety
of digital traces that can be mined to extract signals of
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pending attacks well before suspicious activity is noted on
the target system.
Identifying useful signals of impending cyber attacks
poses several research challenges. First, while some of the
data relating to activities of cyber actors is openly avail-
able, malicious actors often obfuscate their actions using
anonymized and encrypted Internet protocols. Second, the
behavioral processes generating activities of interest are
likely to be weak, sparse, and transient, posing significant
challenges to picking them out from among massive quan-
tities of entirely innocuous activity. Finally, translating the
signals to generate a warning about a cyber attack presents
yet another challenge.
Under the IARPA-funded CAUSE program, USC Infor-
mation Sciences Institute has developed an end-to-end pro-
totype, called EFFECT, to forecast emerging cyber threats.
This paper describes two machine learning methods for
time series prediction that are used by EFFECT to forecast
cyber attacks. The methods take as input historical data
to learn a model of cyber attacks. These models capture
patterns present in historical data that help forecast new
cyber attacks. We show that we can improve the predictions
of these baseline models by leveraging signals from external
Web data sources.
To construct external signals, EFFECT harvests data from
a variety of sources, including vulnerability databases, mali-
cious email and malware trackers, but also from sources not
conventionally used in security applications, such as social
media, blogs and darkweb forums. From these data sources
we extract a variety of time series, each representing the
number of daily occurrences of cyber security-related terms.
The time series are used as external signals in the forecasting
task.
To train the forecasting models, and to evaluate their pre-
dictions, we use the ground truth data about cyber attacks
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provided through the CAUSE program from two compa-
nies. The ground truth data comprise of attacks intercepted
at both organizations, which correspond to three types of
events: malware installed on user’s computer (endpoint-
malware), malicious email (malicious-email) and malicious
destination a user navigates to (malicious-destination).
Specifically, our paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
• Describes and evaluates a time series forecasting
method based on autoregressive models that lever-
age external time series in the prediction task
• Describes and evaluates a time series forecasting
method based on a neural network.
• Identifies signals from online data sources that con-
sistently improve predictions of cyber attacks in the
ground truth data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first
describe the Web data sources used by EFFECT. Next, we
describe in detail the two machine learning algorithms used
in the forecasting task, as well as how they are trained.
Finally, we evaluate prediction results and discuss the sig-
nificance of predictive signals identified by the system.
2 DATA
In this section, we briefly describe the Web data sources
used by EFFECT, how signals are extracted from these
sources, and the ground truth data used to train and validate
forecasting models.
2.1 Web Data Sources
2.1.1 Dark/deep web
Deep and Dark (D2Web) web are non-indexed sites on the
open Internet which are accessed using anonymization pro-
tocols (most notably the TOR protocol). These web sites host
discussion forums and marketplaces, which are often used
for malicious or illicit purposes, for example, to buy and
sell drugs, guns, hacked data or exploits. It has been shown
that the activity on these websites can signal potential cyber
attacks [1], [2], [3], [4]. The infrastructure used to collect the
data is described in [5], [6]. Close to 300 different D2Web
sites were used for this study.
2.1.2 Twitter
It has been shown that discussions on social media can be
used as signals for detecting cyber threats [4], [7]. Therefore
we collected tweets which where either posted by security
experts or contained cyber security related keywords by
manually compiling a list of almost 250 experts and 1500
multilingual security related terms.
2.1.3 Blogs
Security blogs are posts written by expert analysts regarding
news and events in the cyber security domain at the time of
writing. The EFFECT system is crawling about 70 different
websites to collect blog posts. Using security blogs as a data
source for predicting cyber events is relatively new and was
originally proposed in [3], [4].
2.1.4 Vulnerability Database
Software vulnerabilities are often exploited by malicious ac-
tors in cyber attacks [8], [9]. National Vulnerability Database
(NVD) is the largest publicly available repository which con-
tains information about reported vulnerabilities in software.
We collected vulnerabilities for different software products
to evaluate their role in predicting cyber attacks.
2.1.5 Honeypots
A honeypot is a security resource with the goal of having
a system probed and attacked. Traffic reaching honeypots
may be malicious and can provide a window into hacker ac-
tivities. We collected data from a network of ten honeypots
deployed by the EFFECT team [?]: specifically, the number
of queries received daily by each honeypot serves as an
external signal in the cyber forecasting task. The honeypots
were deployed and data was collected starting in October
2017.
2.2 External Signals
Data sources already providing the number of daily events
of a specific type were used as is. To use the textual data
collected by EFFECT for the prediction task, we compiled a
list of 50 important keywords in the cyber security domain.
These keywords included terms, such as 0day, exploits, vpn,
and vulnerabilities. The full list of terms can be found in the
Supplementary Information (SI). We created external signals
from the data sources by extracting the time series of the
number of daily occurrences of each cyber term, giving us
50 external signals for each of the D2Web, social media and
blogs domains.
2.3 Ground Truth
We use as ground truth (GT) data about three types of
cyber attacks provided by two organizations to the CAUSE
program (refered to as OrgA and OrgB). The data contains
occurrence times of three types of cyber attacks:
• An endpoint-malware attack is recorded when anti-
virus software used by the organization finds mal-
ware installed on end-user’s system.
• A malicious-email attack is the receipt of an email
that contains a malicious email attachment and/or a
link to a known malicious destination.
• A malicious-destination attack is recorded when end-
user clicks on a malicious URL.
These data cover a period from July 2017 to January
2018.
3 METHODS
In this section, we describe the time series modeling ap-
proaches we use for the problem of cyber attack prediction.
We give an overview of classical approaches based on
autoregressive models and more recent approaches which
use neural networks for prediction. Next, we describe the
training and predicting methods for the two machine learn-
ing approaches used in forecasting cyber attacks.
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External
Signals
Fig. 1. Illustration of cyber attack forecasting. We assume that ground
truth data representing historical cyber attacks is provided for training
prediction models, along with external signals. The predictions are made
for events occurring during the future time period.
3.1 Forecasting Task
Figure 1 illustrates the forecasting task. Given a time se-
ries describing observed events in the ground truth data,
our goal is to use this information, plus information from
external signals, to predict new events occurring during
some future forecasting time span. The prediction model is
trained on the historical GT data and external signals. The
illustration highlights the common case where up-to-date
historical GT data may not be available, but we assume that
most recent external signals are always available.
3.2 Forecasting Models
3.2.1 Autoregressive Models
We apply the popular ARIMA and ARIMAX models to
the forecasting task. ARIMA stands for autoregressive in-
tegrated moving average. The key idea behind ARIMA is
that the number of current events (yt) depends on the past
counts and forecast errors. Formally, ARIMA(p,d,q) defines
an autoregressive model with p autoregressive lags, d dif-
ference operations, and q moving average lags (see [10]).
Given the observed series of events Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yT ),
ARIMA(p,d,q) applies d (≥ 0) difference operations to trans-
form Y to a stationary series Y ′. Then the predicted value y′t
at time point t can be expressed in terms of past observed
values and forecasting errors which is as follows:
y′t = c+
p∑
i=1
αiy
′
t−i +
q∑
j=1
βjet−j + et (1)
Here c is a constant, αi is the autoregressive (AR) coefficient
at lag i, βj is the moving average (MA) coefficient at lag
j, et−j = y′t−j − yˆ′t−j is the forecast error at lag j, and
et is assumed to be the white noise (et ∼ N (0, σ2)). The
AR model is essentially an ARIMA model without moving
average terms.
ARIMAX (Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average
with Exogenous variables) is an autoregressive model
that leverages (optional) external signals. In this model,
the observation at a particular time point depends on
immediate past observations, past forecast errors, and
external variables. Like ARIMA, ARIMAX(p,d,q) is defined
with the same three autoregressive order terms as ARIMA.
Given the observed series of events Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yT )
and optional K external features
X = (〈x11, x21, . . . , xK1〉,
〈x12, x22, . . . , xK2〉, . . . , 〈x1T , x2T , . . . , xKT 〉),the model
is defined as follows:
y′t = c+
p∑
i=1
αiy
′
t−i +
q∑
j=1
βjet−j +
K∑
k=1
γkxkt + et (2)
Here Y ′ is the stationary series after d difference operations,
c is a constant, αi is the autoregressive (AR) coefficient at
lag i, βj is the moving average (MA) coefficient at lag j,
et−j = y′t−j − yˆ′t−j is the forecast error at lag j, γk is the
coefficient for feature xk and et is assumed to be the white
noise.
3.2.1.1 Training: We use maximum likelihood esti-
mation for learning the parameters; more specifically, pa-
rameters are optimized with LBFGS method [11]. These
models assume that (p, d, q) are known and the series is
weakly stationary. To select the values for (p, d, q) we em-
ploy grid search over the values of (p, d, q) and select the
one with minimum AIC score.
3.2.1.2 Prediction: For ARIMA, we use the learned
parameters to estimate the event counts for the period with
missing GT and then use these counts with learned param-
eters to predict next month’s/week’s cyber attack counts.
For ARIMAX, similar to ARIMA, we first estimate the event
counts for the period with missing GT using learned param-
eters, past GT, and external sources. The model then predicts
next month’s/week’s cyber attack count with the estimated
count for missing GT period and the external sources.
3.2.2 Neural Network Models
Neural network based models have been widely used for
time series analysis as far back as 2003 with [12]. The autore-
gressive models express the predicted event count as a linear
function of external signals and historical counts. However,
neural network based models can capture the non-linearity
by using multiple layers of non-linear activation functions.
The caveat is that such models typically require a large
amount of training data to accurately estimate the model
parameters.
Recently, many variants of recurrent neural network
units have been proposed including Long Short Term Mem-
ory (LSTM) [13], Phased LSTM [14] and Gated Recurrent
Unit (GRU) [15]. The units are composed of various gates
such as input, forget and output. The variants differ in the
number, type and connections between gates.
LSTM is composed of the above gates and a cell state, a
unit is displayed in Figure 2. The outputs of these gates are
calculated as follows:
ft = σ(Wf [ht−1, xt] + bf ) (3)
it = σ(Wi[ht−1, xt] + bi) (4)
ot = σ(Wo[ht−1, xt] + bo) (5)
ht = ot ∗ tanh(Ct), (6)
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Fig. 2. Long Short-Term Memory architecture.
where W∗ and b∗ are weight matrices and bias vectors
respectively. The cell state is updated using:
Cˆt = tanh(Wc[ht−1, xt] + bc) (7)
Ct = ft ∗ Ct−1 + it ∗ Cˆt, (8)
where Ct is the cell state. The parameters are learned using
backpropagation and gradient descent.
PhasedLSTM was recently developed to process irregular
and sparse time series. The model extends LSTM and adds a
new time gate which controls when the cell state is updated.
The gate oscillates between open and closed. In open state,
the LSTM cell state is updated, whereas, while in the closed
state the cell state is propagated from previous time step.
This gate introduces two parameters: ron and τ which
control the ratio of duration of the open phase to full period
and time period of oscillation respectively.
GRU unit uses gates similar to LSTM unit. However, it
merges the forget and input gate into an update gate which
is calculated as follows:
zt = σ(Wzxt + Uzht−1). (9)
It also merges hidden state and output which is computed
as follows:
ht = (1− zt)ht−1 + zthˆt (10)
hˆt = tanh(W [rt ∗ ht−1, xt]), (11)
where rt is the reset gate and is computed similar to update
gate as rt = σ(Wrxt + Urht−1).
3.2.2.1 Training: We use Adaptive Moment Estima-
tion (Adam) [16] to learn the neural network parameters. We
select the hyperparameters including network architecture
and learning rate using cross-validation on held out data
set. For monthly and weekly analyses, we use our historical
data until the start of the previous month and previous week
respectively.
3.2.2.2 Prediction: We use the learned parameters
on training data to predict next month’s/week’s cyber at-
tack counts. All three methods were used; however, the
results for GRUs are presented as this method is compu-
tationally more efficient with similar or better performance.
3.2.3 Baseline Models
We compare our proposed methods against a baseline
ARIMA model, which predicts the number of future events
from a Poisson distribution with rate λ as the average
number of past events over a time window W . Formally,
λt =
1
W
W∑
i=1
yt−i
yt ∼ Poisson(λt), (12)
where W is selected as the number of time units in a
training period.
3.3 Evaluation Metrics
We use two different measures for quantitative evaluation
of predictions made by the models.
First, we use program-wide metrics to evaluate the
accuracy of predictions. The metrics work by matching
predictions against the ground truth data. To that end, we
convert predicted event counts for each day to warnings of
attacks predicted for that day. We then match the warnings
against ground truth data using the Hungarian matching
algorithm [17]. The algorithm compares predicted warnings
w to ground truth events g. The algorithm identifies the
mutually exclusive pairs M = {(w, g)}, such that the sum
of similarities
∑
(w,g)∈M sim(w, g) is maximized. Ifw occurs
within some time window of event g, then sim(w, g) equals
the quality score. Otherwise sim(w, g) = 0. The window
around the actual events varies based on the event type:
for endpoint-malware, it is 0.875 days, malicious-destination
within 1.625 days and malicious-email within 1.375 days.
Using the matching algorithm, we can consistently quantify
the precision and recall of the predictions, and calculate
the resulting F1-score, which gives the geometric mean of
precision and recall.
• Precision
P =
TP
TP + FP
• Recall
R =
TP
TP + FN
• F1
F1 =
2 ∗ P ∗R
P +R
Here, TP , TN and FN denote the true positives, true
negatives and false negatives respectively.
To measure the forecasting error of the model, we use
three measures: (a) mean absolute error (MAE), b) root
mean squared error (RMSE), and c) mean absolute scaled
error (MASE) [18]. These measures are defined in terms of
forecasting error, et = yt − y′t, at daily time steps t, where
yt and y′t are the true and predicted values, respectively.
• Mean Absolute Error
MAE =
1
T
T∑
t=1
|et|
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• Root Mean Squared Error
RMSE =
√√√√ 1
T
T∑
t=1
|et|2
• Mean Absolute Scaled Error
MASE =
1
T
∑T
t=1 |et|
1
T−1
∑T
t=2 |yt − yt−1|
4 RESULTS
4.1 Baseline Monthly vs Weekly Analysis
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Fig. 3. Baseline Monthly vs Weekly Predictions
In order to understand how the granularity of the pre-
diction window affects performance we test two prediction
windows: (i) month, and (ii) week. For monthly prediction,
all historical GT data and external signals through the
previous month are used to make predictions for the next
month. For weekly prediction, GT data up to the start of the
previous month and external signals through the previous
week are used to make next week’s predictions. We use
this framework, because GT data is released on a monthly
basis within the CAUSE program, while external signals are
available on a continual basis.
Figure 3 shows prediction performance of the baseline
models, which use historical GT data through the end of
the previous month only, as a function of time for the
two target organizations and three event types. Information
contained in the historical data allows models to achieve
decent prediction performance, except for the malicious-
destination event type, which contains too few events for
ARIMAX to learn from. In contrast, the GRU model is
able to learn from even sparse data. With respect to the
granularity of prediction, making predictions for a week
should yield higher performance than monthly predictions.
However, here we observe that there is either comparable
performance, with no statistical difference between monthly
and weekly, or decreased performance from monthly to
weekly. This is in part due to the sparsity of the data, as
removing any weeks with zero events (and thus zero F1)
raises the weekly score to be comparable to the monthly in
most cases. This is also in part due to the fact that when
we train on weeks, we may experience something similar
to Fig. 5, where we see strong performance in one or two
weeks of a month get washed out by weak performance
during the rest of the month. Considering these aspects,
monthly performance is used an the evaluation time frame
in our analyses. We only consider monthly predictions for
the rest of the paper and results for weekly performance can
be found at the end of the document.
4.2 Finding Correlated Signals
Correlation analysis is done as a pre-processing step to pick
out signals that may have predictive value. For each target
time series, we compute the lagged cross correlation with
all other signals. The lagged signal is created by shifting
the time series by a certain amount. We used lags from
−30 to 0 days and chose the lag with highest correlation.
Figure 4 shows the correlation of three data sources with
ground truth data. For OrgA, Blogs overall have the highest
correlations followed by D2Web signals and then Twitter.
For OrgB, D2Web has the highest correlations, with Blogs
following and then Twitter. In both cases, Twitter is the
lowest. OrgB endpoint malware has the highest correlation
with any of the external signals and oracle, accounts, black-
mail and malwares are the keywords with highest average
correlations. The same analysis was done for the other
two data sources, vulnerabilities and honeypots. Refer to
the Appendix section for their corresponding plots. Out of
these, vulnerabilities related to f5 big-ip and Oracle have
high correlation with malicious email, especially orgB. Ora-
cle vulnerabilities also have high correlations with malware
endpoints as do Mozilla and Novell.
4.3 Identifying Predictive Signals
From the correlation analysis we have 285 signals we can
use in our models. As these 285 signals span several data
sources and are individually evaluated on several differ-
ent prediction tasks, it is difficult to reason about any
performance measure without summarizing it visually. We
analyze the performance of each signal within a data source
and then provide comparison across various data sources.
Before using external signals in prediction, we first align
them using correlation analysis with GT: we determine
the lag where maximum correlation occurred between a
temporal feature and GT, and use the lag for alignment. For
ARIMAX we set a maximum auto-regressive lag of 7 days.
In each section, we report the five signals with the highest
average lift (defined as the ratio of the model trained with
signal X to the baseline model) in F1 score for each event-
type-target combination. Summary results using forecasting
error measures, specifically, RMSE are in the supplemental
material in Table ?? to Table ??.
4.3.1 Blog Signals
Figure 6 shows improvements in prediction performance
due to signals from blogs, evaluated using GRUs. The
results using ARIMAX can be found in the supplemen-
tal material. For OrgA the top signals work best for
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Fig. 4. Correlation of word count signals with ground truth
endpoint-malware and for OrgB, the top signals work best
with the malicious-destination events. Additionally, OrgB’s
malicious-destination events can be better predicted than
other event from either organization, with usb, blackmail
and zeroday being the best keywords. For OrgA, endpoint-
malware was the most predictive with keyword is phishing.
For malicious-email, it is very difficult for blogs to predict
this event type well with neither organization above a lift
of 2. However, vulnerability and ransomware were both in
the top 3 signals for both organizations. Interestingly, the
majority of the keywords that were the best for OrgA
were not best for OrgB. The only terms that carried over
were ransomware, vulnerability and zeroday. The ground truth
events and associated best signals are different for the two
companies analyzed. This is indicated in the correlation
analysis above and Figure 6.
4.3.2 D2Web Signals
Figure 7 highlights the results of key terms in D2Web posts
for GRU and this performance is better than ARIMAX pre-
dictions. Similar to GRU blogs, predictive signals work best
with malicious-destination, especially for OrgB. This may
indicate that blogs and d2web as a source are very similar
in their underlying signals. Other similarities to blogs are
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how key term signals perform better than the baseline for
endpoint-malware works better for OrgA than for OrgB.
The keywords overlap more than for blogs, but still not
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Fig. 7. Monthly GRU F1 performance of D2web signals.
a significant amount. However, the top two keywords for
malicious-destination for both organizations were account
and hack.
4.3.3 Twitter Signals
Figure 8 illustrates the performance of Twitter keywords
as external signals for cyber attack prediction using GRU.
Similar to blogs and D2Web, malicious-destination events
for OrgB achieve higher lift using the external signals than
other event types with endpoint-malware being a close
second for OrgA. Extremely low improvement over base-
line for malicious email suggests that keyword counts on
Twitter do not provide information predictive of malicious
email counts which is the same for blogs and D2web. For
malicious destination, the terms trojan, trojans, account and
accounts are in the top 5 predictive signals for OrgB. The
unique aspect of the Twitter signal is how the endpoint-
malware for OrgA and the malicious-destination for OrgB
using GRUs has more of a gradient than blogs or D2Web. As
such, 0day has a significantly more comparative advantage
over the second best keyword of breach for OrgA endpoint-
malware.
4.3.4 Vulnerability Signals
The predictive capacity of published vulnerabilities in soft-
ware is illustrated in Figure 9. The overall performance
gain is similar to other sources for the GRU models. Here
we observe that Redhat vulnerabilities are of predictive
improvement on malicious-destination attacks for OrgB
which is counter to what we would expect since both
the companies use Microsoft products. In general, track-
ing vulnerabilities can help identify susceptibility of the
organizations to attacks but only for one event type per
organization. We observe that malicious emails continue to
prove challenging to predict using such signals. In this case,
it is logical as malicious emails do not require exploiting
software vulnerabilities. Similar to other signals, ARIMAX
does not leverage external signals well (see Figure ?? in
Appendix) with maximum improvement about 200% of
baseline. This is due to how GRU handles sparsity in a
signal far better than ARIMAX and vulnerabilities are the
most sparse source.
4.3.5 Honeypot Signals
Fig. 10 shows the common theme that malicious-destination,
particularly for OrgB is the best to predict using GRUs. It is
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Fig. 8. Monthly GRU F1 performance of Twitter signals.
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Fig. 9. Monthly GRU F1 performance of vulnerability signals.
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Fig. 10. Monthly GRU F1 performance of honeypots signals.
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clear that this may be the case due to poor baseline per-
formance on malicious-destination; any performance gain
over baseline does not have to be substantial to achieve
substantial lift. Additionally, the GRU model works bet-
ter than ARIMAX, again due to the sparsity of the data.
Furthermore, the honeypot signal has the least predictive
power for all the sources considered. This is evident that
the best honeypot signal had a lift around 11 whereas all
other sources had best signals well above a lift of 15. This
can be explained however by the fact that we did not start
collecting honeypot data until the end of October 2017,
missing key activity between July and October.
4.4 Selecting the Best Signals Overall
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Fig. 11. Comparing monthly performance models trained on the best
signal for each configuration against baseline.
In order to assess how well the relative lift identifies
predictive signals, we consider the signals with the highest
relative lift for any particular event-type-target configura-
tion and compare its absolute F1 performance against base-
line. Fig. 11 illustrates that when we choose the best signal
accordingly, we see that the model on average outperforms
the baseline every time. In Table 1 we see that these signals
with the highest absolute F1 score come predominantly
from vulnerabilities, with blogs and D2Web following in
contributions. Additional plots of best performing monthly
and weekly signals identified by both models can be found
in Supplementary Information (SI) file.
In Fig. 12 we observe substantial variance in the density
of predictions made across the evaluation period, from
GRU trained on d2web zeroday having made predictions
each week to ARIMAX trained on d2web zeroday not having
substantial information to make predictions past the first
week. Interestingly, for ARIMAX malicious-email trained on
OrgB, the baseline arima model seems to perform the best.
The consistency among best performing signals in
monthly forecasts suggests the methods work well to iden-
tify useful signals (see SI for details and comparison to
TABLE 1
Best performing signals for each configuration.
Model Event Type Org Signal F1
GRU mal-dest. A twitter trojan 48.00
GRU mal-dest. B d2web account 50.50
GRU ep-malware A twitter 0day 49.66
GRU ep-malware B twitter windows7 61.91
GRU mal-email A vuln. fedoraproj fedora 65.30
GRU mal-email B twitter phishing 43.12
ARIMAX mal-dest. A d2web oracle 19.05
ARIMAX mal-dest. B blogs oracle 34.69
ARIMAX ep-malware A vuln. graphicsmagick 38.46
ARIMAX ep-malware B baseline 62.22
ARIMAX mal-email A vuln. apple os x 51.34
ARIMAX mal-email B baseline 32.40
weekly forecasts). For malicious destination-type event,
twitter trojan, d2web hack and d2web account work well
across both targets with both models. To forecast malware-
type events, the best signals are twitter 0day, twitter breach,
twitter vulnerability for OrgA and twitter windows7, twit-
ter cpe and twitter ransomware for OrgB. These choices
make sense, as CPE (Common Product Enumeration) num-
bers identify vulnerable software. Interestingly, for mali-
cious email events, the vulnerabilities data source pro-
vides best signals for OrgA, while for OrgB, the best per-
forming signals are twitter phishing, twitter malware, and
blogs ransomware. Ransomware is a type of malware that is
usually spread through email.
twitter_trojan
d2web_account
twitter_0day
twitter_windows7
vulnerability_fedora
twitter_phishing
d2web_oracle
blogs_oracle
vulnerability_graphicsmagick
baseline
vulnerability_apple_os_x
baseline
July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan.
0
20
40
60
80
100
Fig. 12. Temporal performance of the best signals.
5 RELATED WORK
Due to their disruptive nature, predicting cyber attacks is
an important research effort. Most research efforts focus on
using network traffic for forecasting as in [19], [20]. These
methods leverage network traffic or sensors at different
layers as the underlying data to forecasting models. We
specifically avoid network data and base our predictions on
open source information. Other efforts include [21] which
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only used the National Vulnerability Database with moder-
ate success and they highlight the difficulty in using public
sources for building effective models. The main difference is
that our work is based on actual cyber event ground truth
as reported by the two target organizations. The closest to
our research is Gandotra et al [22] who outlined a number
of cyber prediction efforts using statistical modeling and
algorithmic modeling. They highlight several significant
challenges that we tried to address. The first challenge is that
open source ground truth is often incomplete and should be
compiled from multiple sources and analysis doesn’t scale
to real world scenarios. We were able to get ground truth
data from two companies, this ground truth is across three
different attack vectors and is over a two year time period.
The additional challenges in [22] focus on the volume, speed
and heterogeneity of network data which we avoid since we
are attempting to prevent cyber events specifically with non-
network data. They also present two modeling approaches
of statistical modeling and algorithmic modeling. We used
statistical models not unlike what they present as classical
time series models with auto-regressive, integrated moving
average with historical data and external signals.
Developing a precise model for the dynamic behavior
of time series is a challenging problem and an essential
one for the success of forecasting methods. Researchers
have extensively studied and used time-series analysis in
many domains, such as finance [23], epidemiology [24], [25],
geophysics [10], and sociology [26]. A popular strategy for
analyzing time series data is using classical autoregressive
models such as AR, ARMA, ARIMA, and ARIMAX [10],
[27], [28]. Autoregressive models are widely used in intru-
sion detection, detecting DoS attacks, and network moni-
toring [29]. These models assume that the underlying data-
generating process is linear, i.e., the value at a time point is a
linear combination of the past values. However, real-world
time series exhibit volatility and nonlinearity. A way to deal
with the problem of volatility is to employ ARCH and
GARCH, which are extensions of classical autoregressive
models [30].
Neural network based models have been widely used for
time series prediction tasks such as weather forecasting [31],
sentence completion [32] and oilfield production predic-
tion [33]. Recent success in recurrent neural networks [34]
on such tasks has led to produce several variants of the
models such as Long Short Term Memory [13], Peephole-
LSTM [35], Depth Gated RNN [36], Clockwork RNN [37],
Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [15] and Phased LSTM [14].
Cyber security community recently adapted neural network
models. DeepExploit [3] uses neural embeddings to predict
exploit likelihood of a vulnerability. Filonov et al [38] devel-
oped RNN based model for early detection of cyber attacks.
Our model, on the other hand, considers various recurrent
neural network based models on external signals to identify
predictive signals and we report results on GRUs only.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we tackle the challenging problem of predict-
ing targeted cyber attacks. Cyber attacks do not emerge
randomly, rather, they are caused by a vast amount of
hidden factors which include motivational factors like fi-
nancial, espionage fun or grudge; the exploitation of new
or known software and hardware vulnerabilities; the ap-
pearance of new vulnerabilities and malwares, to list a few.
Our approach is to systematically, and in a fully automated
manner, harness these hidden factors to identify predictive
signals from various public data sources such as social
media signals, Internet-based sensors, dark Web, blogs, and
more.
We used state of the art machine learning methods for
time series prediction. We showed that historical ground
truth data already carried enough information to enable
these methods to learn patterns to predict future events. We
then showed how incorporating information from external
signals improves on these forecasts and quantified the im-
provement. In this manner, we are able to identify the best
signals to predict cyber threats for each target organization.
Our framework provides a systematic way that can be
used to improve decision making in Cyber Security Policy.
Our results show that depending on the specific target and
type of attack, different data sources should be monitored
for the early prediction and mitigation of cyber threats.
Indeed, while some external signals are good predictors for
both organizations, the best performing signals are unique
to each target. Thus, providing suggestive evidence that our
method is able to recognize the idiosyncrasies and specific
vulnerabilities of each organization.
Future work will be devoted to enhancing the predictive
power of external signals. One direction is by inferring
latent factors that are common to all signals that have
better predictive power than the signal by itself. A second
idea is to evaluate various linear combinations of predictive
signals as well as exploiting the semantics of the identified
signals. Signal fusion may be especially useful for weekly-
level predictions, as different signals may complement each
other and allow for more robust performance over time.
APPENDIX
Supplemental material can be found here: http://bit.ly/
2GZWFdZ
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